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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE, STATEMENT OF FACTS, & PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
A. Statement of the case.

This case revolves around the Bowen Appellants' [hereinafter "the Bowens"] tax deed
and a document entitled Memorandum of Sale, which the Respondent, G. Lance Salladay
[hereinafter "Salladay1"] alleges entitled him to receive notice of the pending issuance of the tax

deed. The Bovlens contend that SalladaJ 's ~.1emorandum of Sale ,vas not properlJ' recorded
1

pursuant to statute, so Salladay was not entitled to receive notice of the pending tax deed sale.
The Bowens also contend that, even if Salladay was entitled to receive notice of the sale, his
petition to the district court was untimely. The Caldwell Irrigation Lateral District [hereinafter
"CILD"] aligned itself with Salladay.
B. Statement of the facts.

Salladay is the personal representative of the Troutner Estate. R. p. 48, L. 5 (Paragraph 1
of the Affidavit of G. Lance Salladay in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment [hereinafter "Salladay Affidavit"]). Salladay alleges that, "The
estate is the owner of certain property located at 615 E. Chicago St., Caldwell, Idaho, which is
the subject of this action." R. p. 48 L. 6, 7. Mr. Kelly Joe Stroud and Salladay entered into a
purchase and sale transaction, although the details of that transaction are unknown. See R. pp.
48, 85. On February 7, 2012, Salladay recorded a document entitled Memorandum of Sale. R.
p. 48 L. 9 - 12; p. 71 L. 2, 3; p. 84. The record contains no evidence that any document
regarding the purchase and sale transaction between Stroud and Salladay, except for the
Memorandum of Sale, was recorded. See generally R.
On July 14, 2014, CILD issued Operational Maintenance deeds [hereinafter "O&M
deed"] to itself for properties with delinquent tax assessments for the year 2011, including the
property at 615 E. Chicago Street. See generally R. pp. 55 - 57. On December 16, 2014, CILD
accepted a bid from Eric Bowen for the previously issued O&M deed for the property at 615 E.
Chicago Street. R. p. 57 L. 28 - 33; see also R. p. 114 L. 6 - 8. The Bowens' tax deed was

1

As the caption of this action shows, Salladay is acting in his capacity as personal representative
of the Troutner Estate. All references to Salladay in this document are in his capacity as personal
representative of the estate. For ease of flow and for clarity, this brief refers to the respondent
estate as Salladay.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -
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recorded on December 19, 2014. R. p. 84.

CILD provided notice of the O&M deed sale to

Stroud and also provided notice via newspaper publication. R. p. 114 L. 3, 4. Salladay did not
receive a notice letter for the sale of the O&M deed. R. p. 114 L. 9 - 14. Salladay alleges that
he was an interested party pursuant to Idaho Code§ 43-717; and therefore, that he was entitled to
receive notice of the pending tax deed sale because he had recorded the Memorandum of Sale.
R. p. 24 L. 12 - 14, 21, 22. CILD aligned itself with Salladay in these proceedings. Tr. p. 16 L.
16 - 19, p. 27 L. 12- p. 28 L. 13.
C. Procedural History.

On January 5, 2015, Salladay filed a Petition for Reversal of Board Action and to Clear
Title. R. p. 2, L. 13, p. 5. On February 6, 2015, CILD filed an Answer to Petition for Reversal
of Board Action and to Clear Title. R. p. 2, L. 24, p. 13 On February 10, 2015, the Bowens,
through their attorney at the time, filed an Answer to Salladay's petition2 • R. p. 2 L. 29, 30, p.
13. On April 23, 2015, Salladay filed his Amended Petition for Reversal of Board Action and to
Clear Title. R. p. 3 L. 13, p. 23. On April 24, 2015, the Bowens filed a Motion to Dismiss and a
Brief in Support. R. p. 3 L. 14, 15, p. 34. On May 6, 2015, the Bowens filed their Amended
Answer to Amended Petition for Reversal of Board Action and to Clear Title. R. p. 3, L. 20, 21,
p. 34. On May 8, 2015, Salladay filed his Opposition to Defendant Bowens' Motion to Dismiss
with an affidavit from Salladay in support [hereinafter "Salladay Affidavit"]. R. p. 3 L. 22 - 24,
p. 38, 48. On May 12, 2015, the Bowens filed their Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendant Bowens' Motion to Dismiss. R. p. 3 L. 25, 26, p. 61. On May 13, 2015, the Bowens
filed an Objection and Motion to Strike. R. p. 3, L. 27, p. 69. The Objection and Motion to
Strike sought to strike Paragraph six (6) of the Salladay Affidavit and to strike Exhibit one (1) to
the affidavit for reasons based upon inadmissible hearsay and violation of I.RE. 408, statements
made in compromise negotiations. See R. p. 69. After a hearing was held on May 14, 2015, the
district court issued its opinion in its Order to Remand to Board for Determination of Validity of
Tax Deed, entered May 26, 2015. R. p. 3, L. 28 - 35, p. 71. The court's opinion neither ruled on
nor discussed the objection and motion to strike that were argued at the May 14, 2015 hearing.

See generally R. pp. 71 -80.
2

The Bowens' answer was filed in the name Canyon Property Management, LLC, which was the
entity that Salladay's original petition sued. Salladay later amended the petition and replaced the
LLC with Eric and Kathryn Bowen.
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On June 9, 2015, the Bowens filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an affidavit and
brief in support.

R. p. 3 L. 41 - 44, pp. 83 - 94.

On June 25, 2015, Salladay filed a

Memorandum in Opposition to the Bowen Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. R. p. 4 L.
13, 14, p. 95. On July

2015, the Bowens filed their Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to

the Bowen Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. R. p. 4 L. 20, 21, p. 103. The district court
took the case under advisement after holding a hearing on the motion for reconsideration on July
24, 2015. R. p. 4. L. 22 - 25. On August 4, 2015, the district court issued a written decision via
its Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration. R. p. 4. L 29, p. 113. On September 15, 2015,
the Bowens filed their Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. R. p. 4 L 30 - 37, p. 125.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A Whether the district court erred when it held that Salladay's Memorandum of Sale
was properly acknowledged and properly recorded?
B. Whether the district court erred when it held that CILD had constructive notice
pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-811 that Salladay was either an owner or party of
interest?
C. Whether the district court erred when it held that even if the Memorandum of Sale
was not properly recorded, that CILD was required to provide notice to Salladay?
D. Whether the district court erred when it held that CILD had constructive notice
pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-811 that Salladay was either an owner or party of
interest?
E. Whether the district court erred when it held that the Bowens did not rebut or
challenge the Memorandum of Sale pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-707?
F. Whether the district court erred when it held that evidence to rebut the presumption
that the notary acted in compliance with the Idaho Code § 55-707 was absent?
G. Whether the district court erred when it remanded the case to the CILD Board?
H. Whether the district court erred when it held that the CILD Board had authority to
find facts and determine the validity of the tax deed after it was already issued?

I. Whether the district court erred when it found that Appellants/Defendants obtained a
windfall and that CILD conceded such?
J.

Should the Bowens be awarded attorney's fees and costs for this appeal?
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ID. ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court erred when it held that the Memorandum of Sale was properly

recorded.
1. The Memorandum of Sale does not contain a certificate of acknowledgment

as required by Idaho law; and therefore, it did not impart constructive notice
to anyone, including CILD.

The Memorandum of Sale fails to conform to the requirements of Idaho Code § 55-805;
and therefore, the Memorandum of Sale was not "properly recorded," as required by Idaho Code
§ 43-714A(6). Idaho Code§ 55-805 states, in relevant part, as follows: "Before an instrument

may be recorded, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, its execution must be acknowledged
by the person executing it ... or the execution must be proved and the acknowledgment or proof,
certified in substantially the manner prescribed by chapter 7, title 55, Idaho Code ..." The
above-quoted law requires recording both the executed instrument itself and

the

acknowledgment of said instrument by the person who executed it. "The execution of an
instrument and its acknowledgment are separate, independent acts." Little v. Bergdahl Oil
Company, 60 Idaho 662,669, 95 P.2d 833, 836 (S. Ct. 1939).
Idaho Code § 55-709 requires that "an officer taking the acknowledgment of an
instrument must endorse thereon a certificate substantially in the forms hereinafter prescribed."
Idaho Code §§ 55-710 through 55-715 provide the forms, depending upon the capacity of the
parties executing the documents, that the certificates of acknowledgment must substantially
comply with. The statutes require the county in which the instrument was acknowledged, the
date and year of the acknowledgment, a statement that the person personally appeared before the
acknowledging notary, that the person is known to the notary or has provided identification to
the notary, and that the person whose name is "subscribed to the within instrument" also
executed the same. Because Salladay is a fiduciary for the Troutner Estate under Idaho law (see
Idaho Code§ 15-3-703(a)), the form of the certificate is prescribed by Idaho Code § 55-713.
That statute provides as follows:
The certificate of acknowledgment of an instrument which is
executed by a person in his own name as trustee or as executor,
administrator, guardian, sheriff, receiver or other official or representative
capacity, shall be substantially in the following form:
State of Idaho, county of .......... , ss.
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On this ...... day of ..... , in the year ...... , before me (here
insert the name and quality of the officer) personally appeared ...... ,
known or identified to me (or proved to me on the oath of ...... ), to be
the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument as (here
insert the official or representative capacity in which the instrument is
executed) and acknowledged to me that he (or they) executed the same as
such (here insert again the official or representative capacity in which the
instrument is executed).
In the event that the certificate of acknowledgment is defective, the "deficiency can be
cured by reference to the instrument itself" Farm Bureau Finance Company, Inc. v. Carney,
100 Idaho 745, 751, 605 P.2d 509, 515 (S. Ct. 1980) [hereinafter Farm Bureau] (citing Pacific

Coast Joint Stock Land Bank v. Security Prods. Co., 56 Idaho 436, 55 P.2d 716 (1936);
Northwestern & Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. Rauch, 5 Idaho 752, 51 P. 764 (1898)). In Farm
Bureau, a key issue on appeal was whether or not the acknowledgement and recording of a trust
deed was sufficient to impart constructive notice to the respondents. Farm Bureau at 748, 605
P.2d at 512. In its opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted Idaho Code§§ 55-805 and 55-709
before quoting Idaho Code§ 55-710, the relevant statute in that case that prescribed the form for
the certificate of acknowledgement. Id. at 749,605 P.2d at 513.
The Memorandum of Sale does not contain an acknowledgment certificate that
substantially complies with the statutory requirements. To cure the deficiencies, the instrument
itself must be reviewed with the acknowledgment.

Therein lies the problem for Salladay,

because the Memorandum of Sale is merely a one-page document without a certificate of
acknowledgement.

R. p. 85.

Even if Salladay alleges that the recorded document is the

acknowledgment, albeit a defective one, the recorded document does not have an instrument to
which it is attached.

Without an instrument to cure the deficiencies in the alleged

acknowledgment, it cannot be cured under Idaho Law. As a result, the Memorandum of Sale is
not properly recorded. And because a party in interest, as defined by Idaho Code§ 43-714A(6),
must have a properly recorded "valid and legally binding purchase contract, mortgage or deed
of trust" for the subject property, Salladay does not meet the definition of a party in interest.
Thus, Salladay was not entitled to receive notice of the tax deed's pending issuance.
The trust deed in Farm Bureau contained a certificate of acknowledgement that was
similar enough in length and language for the Idaho Supreme Court to hold that it substantially
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complied with the requirements of Idaho Code § 55-709. See Farm Bureau at 749 - 751, 605
P .2d at 513 - 515. In contrast to the certificate of acknowledgement at issue in Farm Bureau, the
Memorandum of Sale in the case at bar does not contain a certificate of acknowledgment at all,
but merely a notary's stamp and signature. R p. 84. The Memorandum of Sale's lack of a
certificate of acknowledgement cannot be cured by reference to the original instrument, because
such an instrument, if it exists, was not recorded. "The recording of an instrument which is not
entitled under the statute to be recorded cannot import constructive notice to anyone." Harris v.

Reed, 21 Idaho 364, 370, 121 P. 780, 782 (1912). As applied to both CILD and the Bowens,
Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is fatally defective, so it was not entitled to be recorded; and
therefore, it did not impart constructive notice to anyone. Salladay' s failure to properly execute
and acknowledge an instrument to be recorded results in him not being entitled to receive notice
of the tax-deed proceedings and sale; and as a result, this Court should reverse the district court
and order the district court to dismiss Salladay' s petition.

2. The Memorandum of Sale is void against the Bowens pursuant to Idaho
Code § 55-812.

Idaho Code § 55-812 states: "Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a
term not exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of
the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose
conveyance is first duly recorded." ( emphasis added) "Before an instrument may be recorded,
unless it is otherwise expressly provided, its execution must be acknowledged by the person
executing it ... or the execution must be proved and the acknowledgement or proof, certified in
substantially the manner prescribed by chapter 7, title 55, Idaho Code ...." Idaho Code § 55805 (emphasis added). While the district court held that the Bowens did not challenge the
acknowledgement under Idaho Code § 55-707 (R. p. 120 L. 8 - 10), the Bowens' challenge of
whether or not the Memorandum of Sale was properly recorded pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-805
includes, by reference, challenging the Memorandum of Sale pursuant to "chapter 7, title 55,
Idaho Code ...." The Bowens clearly argued that the Memorandum of Sale failed to comply
with Idaho Code § 55-805. R. p. 104 L. 4 - p. 109 L. 2. Thus, the district court erred when it
held that the Bowens did not challenge the Memorandum of Sale under Idaho Code § 55-707.
Further, the district court held that evidence to rebut the presumption that the notary acted in
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compliance with Idaho Code § 55-707 was lacking.

R. p. 120 L. 11 - 14.

The evidence

regarding whether or not the notary acted in compliance with Idaho Code § 55-707 is contained
on the face of the Memorandum of Sale. See generally R. p. 85. The document contains only a
notary's stamp without a certificate of acknowledgment at all (Id.)_ Further, the Bowens made a
more specific challenge under "chapter 7, title 55, Idaho Code . . . ." by challenging the
Memorandum of Sale's compliance with the required form of the certificate of acknowledgement
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 55-709 through 55-715. R. p. 104 L. 4 - p. 109 L. 2. Thus, the
district court erred when it held that evidence to rebut the presumption of the notary's
compliance was lacking.

a. Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is not an instrument entitled to be recorded.
Salladay's Memorandum of Sale appears to be an attempt to summarize a conveyance of
real property pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-813; however, the document fails to satisfy both the
requirements to convey real property and the requirements of recording a summary instrument.
Idaho law defines a conveyance as: "[E]very instrument in writing by which any estate or

interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, or by which title to
any real property may be affected, except wills." Idaho Code § 55-813 (bolded emphasis
added). "The general requirements for a conveyance of real property are outlined in the Idaho
Code, which provides:

'A conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an

instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto
authorized by writing.

The name of the grantee and his complete mailing address must

appear on such instrument.' Idaho Code§ 55-601. See also Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,
192 P.3d 1036, 1044 (Idaho 2008) (endorsing this general rule)."

Hopkins v. Thomason Farms,

Inc. (In re Thomason), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1769 at *11 (Bankr. D. Idaho June 24, 2009)
(quoting Idaho Code§ 55-601) (bolded emphasis added).
In the above-cited Hopkins case, a key issue was whether or not a recorded mortgage was
legally deficient, and therefore invalid. Hopkins at *10. The Hopkins Court found that the
document at issue satisfied "the first requirement that the instrument be subscribed by the
mortgagor or his agent." Id. at *11. The court then reasoned and held as follows: "However,
the latter requirement under the statute is not satisfied. Although each of the Thomasons also
signed the document, they did not include their complete mailing addresses on the

instrument, nor did they incorporate them by reference to some other document. As such, this
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mortgage instrument fails to comply with the requirements under Idaho law and is therefore
invalid." Id. at *11, *12 (emphasis added).
The Hopkins Court also found that the mortgage document was a contract that lacked
"several essential terms." Id. at * 12. The amount of debt was not identified and, except for a
statement that the debt was "due and owing," there were no repayment terms. Id. "Because a
mortgage is subject to the statute of frauds, gaps in essential terms cannot be filled by parol
evidence." Hopkins at *12 (citing Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194, 197 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1993)).

The court found that the document was fatally imprecise and vague and

resulted in the court holding that the mortgage was both invalid and unenforceable - the
Thomason's were not entitled to receive a distribution from the proceeds of the subject
property's sale. Id.
While Hopkins is not relevant to the case at bar regarding the enforceability of the alleged
conveyance between Salladay and Stroud, Hopkins is on point in regards to the process of
determining the validity of a purported real property conveyance instrument before determining
what effect, if any, the document has.

The same procedural analysis should apply to the

Memorandum of Sale in the case at bar. Pursuant to the holding in the Hopkins case, if the
Memorandum of Sale is fatally defective, it is invalid.
Like the document at issue in Hopkins, the Memorandum of Sale in the case at bar is in
writing. Salladay's signature appears as "Personal Representative of the Estate of Roger John
Troutner." R. p. 85 (Memorandum of Sale, Canyon County instrument number 2012004992,
filed as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of William J. O'Connor in Support of Motion to Reconsider,
filed June 9, 2015). The Memorandum of Sale was stipulated as evidence during the May 14,
2015 hearing. Tr. P. 79 L. 1 - 15. And also like the document in Hopkins, the Memorandum of

Sale does not contain a mailing address for the Troutner Estate, nor does the document
incorporate a mailing address by reference to some other document. Hopkins at *12, (emphasis
added). Based upon those facts alone, this Court should find the Memorandum of Sale to be
fatally defective, and therefore, invalid.
But there is more evidence in the case at bar than in the Hopkins case that should
mandate such a holding. Similar to the document at issue in Hopkins, the Memorandum of Sale
contains no sale amount, and no amount of outstanding debt or a payment schedule is identified.
Id. To be consistent with the holding in Hopkins, this Court should hold that the Memorandum
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of Sale fails to meet the requirements of a conveyance pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-601; and
therefore, it is fatally defective and invalid. And because said Memorandum of Sale is fatally
defective and invalid, it was not entitled to be recorded, it did not provide constructive notice to
anyone, including CILD, of its contents, and it is void against a subsequent purchaser in good
faith who pays a valuable consideration for the same property. The Bowens' tax deed was
recorded on December 19, 2014. R. p. 84. The Bowens are subsequent purchasers in good faith
and for value, so the Memorandum of Sale, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-812, is void against the
Bowens' recorded tax deed.
b. Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is not a legally valid summary instrument.
The Memorandum of Sale fails to meet the requirements of recording a summary
instrument pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-818. "A summary of the instrument shall be signed and
acknowledged by all parties to the original instrument. The summary of the instrument shall
clearly state: the names of the parties to the original instrument, the complete mailing address of
the grantee, the title and date of the instrument, a description of the interest or interests in real
property created by the instrument, and the legal description of the property." Id. While the
Memorandum of Sale states the address and legal description of the property that "has been
sold," it fails to specify the mailing address of the purchaser. It is not signed and acknowledged
by all parties to the original instrument, because neither the signature of Kelly Joe Stroud nor the
acknowledgment thereof appears on the Memorandum of Sale. Neither does the Memorandum
of Sale specify whom the seller or grantee is; nor does it describe the interest or interests in real
property created by the purported instrument.
Further, not only does the document fail to specify the date and title of the instrument, but
the Memorandum of Sale does not state whether or not such a separate instrument regarding the
sale exists. The document refers to a "Contract of Sale" (R. p. 85 L. 4), which one might assume
is in writing, but there is no evidence regarding whether or not the Contract of Sale is a written
document. See generally R. Because the Hopkins Court held a mortgage to be invalid for failure
to provide the complete mailing address of the grantor, this Court should hold that the
Memorandum of Sale, which fails to provide not only essential elements but also any reference
to whether or not there was a separate instrument that the Memorandum of Sale was purported to
summarize, is fatally defective; and therefore, it is invalid. Thus, the Memorandum of Sale was
not entitled to be recorded, so Salladay was not entitled to receive notice of the tax-deed sale.
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the unrecorded prior alleged conveyance void against the Bowens pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55812.

c. In summary, Salladay's Memorandum of Sale is void against the Bowens pursuant
to Idaho Code § 55-812.
The preceding analysis proves that Salladay failed to properly record a conveyance or
other document that would have entitled him to receive notice of the pending tax-deed sale. The
Memorandum of Sale complies with neither the requirements of recording a conveyance nor the
requirements of recording a summary instrument based upon an original instrument. The record
contains no evidence that any document regarding the purchase and sale transaction between
Stroud and Salladay, except for the Memorandum of Sale, was recorded. See generally R. The
tax deed granted to the Bowens was recorded on December 19, 2014. R. p. 60 (Exhibit 4 to the
Affidavit of G. Lance Salladay, filed May 8, 2015). As a necessary result and pursuant to Idaho
Code § 55-812, any unrecorded prior conveyance of the disputed property is void as against the
Bowens, subsequent purchasers of the same property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, because their conveyance was first duly recorded. Therefore, this Court should
reverse the district court and hold that the Memorandum of Sale and any and all unrecorded
instruments that the Memorandum of Sale may have attempted to summarize are void as against
the Bowens' recorded tax deed.
B.

The district court erred when it held that even if the Memorandum of Sale was not

properly recorded, that CILD was required to provide notice of the pending tax-deed sale
to Salladay.
The preceding analysis proves that the Memorandum of Sale was not properly
acknowledged and it was not entitled to be recorded. Thus, Salladay was not entitled to receive
notice of any of the proceedings regarding the delinquent assessments and the tax-deed sale.
While the district court held that CILD failed to locate the Memorandum of Sale, resulting in
Salladay not receiving notice of the sale (R. p. 113 L. 23 - p. 114 L. 1 - 3), there is simply no
evidence in the record to support that finding. See generally R. The record does not contain an
affidavit from CILD or any of its employees regarding actions taken or not taken regarding the
Memorandum of Sale. See generally R. While Salladay attempted to submit as evidence a letter
from CILD' s lawyer to the Bowens' previous lawyer, which does not allege that CILD failed to
locate the Memorandum of Sale (See R. pp. 51, 52), the Bowens' filed an Objection and Motion
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to Strike said document as inadmissible hearsay that also contains settlement discussions in
violation of I.RE. 408. R p. 69. The parties argued the objection and motion to strike at the
May 14, 2015 hearing. Tr. p. L. 6

p. 28 L. 16. The district court's opinion neither ruled on nor

discussed the objection and motion to strike that was argued at the May 14, 2015 hearing. See

generally R. pp. 71-80.
The Bowens hereby renew their Objection and Motion to Strike. If this Court holds that
Salladay was not entitled to receive notice of the pending tax-deed sale, then the issue will likely
be irrelevant. However, if this Court does not make such a holding, then the Bowens ask this
Court to rule on whether Paragraph 6 of the Salladay Affidavit and its Exhibit A should be struck
based upon the record already before this Court.
1. Salladay's Memorandum of Sale refers to the subject property's sale as taking place

in present perfect tense - a present statement referring to a past event - so the
document's plain language should have resulted in Stroud receiving notice, but not
Salladay.
In relevant parts, the Memorandum of Sale states as follows: "There has been sold,
subject to all easements and restrictions of record and compliance with the terms of the Contract
of Sale, the following property, described as a single family residence."

(Bolded emphasis

added). "There has been sold" is present perfect tense - a tense used to refer to a past event
without a specified time frame. The word "has" is present tense, but the verb "been sold" is past
tense. It is a present statement referring to a past event. While language follows the present
perfect tense that denotes conditions pursuant to which the property was sold under, taken in
context, those words refer to the prior event - the sale - that already had taken place at the time
when the Memorandum of Sale was recorded.
The Memorandum of Sale further states that Stroud was the purchaser. R p. 48, 84. The
plain meaning of the words, in the tense that Salladay used, leads to the conclusion that the
Memorandum of Sale refers to a sale that took piace some time before the instrument was
recorded. Therefore, Salladay, by recording said memorandum, estopped himself from being
entitled to receive notice as a record owner.

2. Salladay's Memorandum of Sale may contain ambiguities that cannot be cured by
reference to the instrument itself, because no such instrument was recorded.
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Another fatal flaw of the Memorandum of Sale is that additional ambiguities lie within
the subject-matter content that the document refers to.

The plain language of the document

refers to a past sale and fails to clarify the essential terms of the alleged contract. Because the
Memorandum of Sale's failure to provide essential terms cannot be cured by referencing any
instrument that the document may refer to, it fails to provide constructive notice to anyone.
Based upon the foregoing facts, law, and analysis, the Bowens respectfully ask this Court to
reverse the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss Salladay' s petition.
Salladay alleged that the Memorandum of Sale is "subject to ... compliance with the
terms of the Contract of Sale ..." and "vesting" of the sale, which he alleges is a condition
precedent. R. p. 95 L. 30 - p. 96 L. 4. Salladay's interpretation of the Memorandum of Sale - in
spite of the document's own language stating that the property "has been sold" - is further
evidence that the document is imprecise and vague. To understand what the document attempts
to encapsulate, one must refer to the instrument itself. As previously cited in this brief, in the
event that the certificate of acknowledgment is defective, the "deficiency can be cured by
reference to the instrument itself." Farm Bureau, supra, at 751, 605 P.2d at 515. But because
Salladay failed to record the instrument itself, there is not a cure for interpreting the
Memorandum of Sale. Because this issue has already been analyzed in detail in this brief, the
Bowens refer to the law, analysis, and arguments previously analyzed and argued in this brief.

C.

The district court erred when it remanded the case to the CILD Board because

Idaho Code§ 43-719 applies only while a tax deed is "pending issuance."
In its Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, the district court reasoned that Idaho
Code § 43-719 provides a statutory remedy for Salladay. R. p. 122 L. 12 - p. 123 L. 2. The
district court's first written decision in this action, Order to Remand to Board for Determination
of Validity of Tax Deed, specifically stated as follows: "Idaho Code section 43-719(4) allows
any party 'aggrieved by the final decision of the board concerning the issuance of a tax deed ... '
to seek judicial review." R. p. 78 L. 1, 2. But when taken as a whole and analyzed in context,
Idaho Code § 43-719 provides a chronological step-by-step remedy that begins only while a tax
deed is "pending issuance" and not at any time thereafter. Because the O&M deed regarding the
subject property was issued on July 14, 2014 (See generally R. pp. 55-57), and the Bowens' tax
deed was issued on December 19, 2014 (R. p. 84), there was not a tax deed that was pending
issuance at the time of the district court's decision. Thus, the statute is inapplicable as a remedy,
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because CILD no longer had statutory authority to make decisions regarding the already-issued
tax deed.
Idaho Code§ 43-719(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "When a record owner or
owners or any party in interest upon whom a notice of pending issuance of tax deed is served
. fails to appear or otherwise defend and answer at the time set for hearing in such notice and it is
made to appear to the board that the owner of the tax certificate or treasurer has fulfilled the
requirements of sections 43-717 and 43-718, Idaho Code, the board shall, without further notice
to the record owner or owners ... immediately direct that the treasurer shall issue a tax deed
in favor of the district or the owner of the tax certificate, as the case may be. (Bolded emphasis
added). The plain meaning of subsection one of the statute exclusively applies to a time frame
before a tax deed is issued; and more specifically, it applies to "the time set for hearing in such
notice." Additionally, the record lacks any evidence that CILD's treasurer failed to fulfill the
requirements of Idaho Code §§ 43-717 and 43-718. See generally R.
When applied to Idaho Code § 43-719(1)'s chronological step-by-step process, the fact
that CILD already issued the duly acknowledged tax deed "is prima facie evidence of the
regularity of all other proceedings for the assessment, inclusive, up to the execution of the deed."
Idaho Code § 43-720(7). Further, "[t]he deed conveys to [the Bowens] the absolute title to the
lands described therein, free of all encumbrances except mortgages of record to the holders of
which notice has not been sent in this chapter provided ...." Id. Said exception does not include
Salladay, because Salladay is not a holder of a mortgage of record. See generally R.
Idaho Code § 43-719(2) applies only when a tax deed has not been issued. In relevant
part, the statute states as follows: "When a record owner or owners or any party in interest upon
whom such notice is served ... appears or answers at the date specified in such notice, the
board shall consider documentary evidence and hear testimony and make a final decision in
writing." (Bolded emphasis added). The words "such notice" refer to the "notice of pending
issuance of tax deed" in Idaho Code§ 43-719(1). In the case at bar, the tax deed is not pending
issuance - it was already issued - and therefore; Idaho Code § 43-719(2)'s notice, being the
same notice described in Idaho Code§ 43-719(1), cannot provide a remedy because the tax deed
is not pending issuance and the time and place set for hearing in such notice has passed.
Further Idaho Code § 43-719(1) mandates that the board shall immediately direct the
treasurer to issue a tax deed in the event that two things happen: 1) an owner or party in interest
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"fails to appear or otherwise defend and answer at the time set for hearing in such notice," and
upon that failure to appear or otherwise defend, 2) "it is made to appear to the board that the
owner of the tax certificate or the treasurer has fulfilled the requirements of 43-717 and 43-718,
Idaho Code." (Bolded emphasis added). Because the effect of a duly acknowledged tax deed "is

prima facie evidence of the regularity of all other proceedings for the assessment, inclusive, up to
the execution of the deed," and because the statute contemplates no further proceedings by the
board after the tax deed has been issued, the deed's issuance ended CILD's proceedings
regarding the previously unpaid assessments; and CILD cannot take action in further proceedings
regarding the issuance of the Bowens' tax deed. See generally Idaho Code §§ 43-719 and 43720.
Continuing to analyze Idaho Code § 43-719(2), in light of the effect of the deed as
provided in Idaho Code § 43-720, shows that it is the next procedural step applicable only when
an owner or party in interest "appears or answers at the date specified in such notice" (of pending
issuance of the tax deed). The appearance of a party to defend and to attempt to prevent the
deed's issuance is the triggering event that can lead to a final decision of the board. Similar to
when a party fails to defend a lawsuit and the plaintiff becomes the prevailing party by default,
failure to appear before the board or otherwise defend the pending tax-deed issuance results in
waiver of a party's right to present evidence and challenge the evidence before the board. Even
if a party appears and defends, the board shall immediately direct the treasurer to issue a tax deed
if the board finds that the treasurer conformed to the requirements of 43-717 and 43-718, Idaho
Code, and that a delinquent assessment was owing on the property described in the notice and

that such delinquency has not been paid. See Idaho Code§ 43-719(2). While a final decision of
the board may be reviewed by the district court, failing to appear or otherwise defend the
pending issuance of the deed results in not having a final decision from the board for judicial
review. Just as a party who fails to appear in court waives its right to provide evidence and
challenge the evidence of its opponent before a neutral finder of fact, a party who fails to appear
before the board does the same. The result in each case is that a record is established, albeit one
with one-sided evidence.
As Idaho Code§ 43-719 continues, each subsection builds upon the previous. Subsection
three refers to subsection two's proceeding, whether a contested proceeding took place or not. In
the event that a party appeared to challenge the tax deed's issuance and that party was aggrieved

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -

Page 14

by the board's final decision, Idaho Code § 43-719(4) provides for judicial review of the final
decision. Just as a party that defaults in a civil court case will not have any evidence for an
appellate court to review, a non-appearing or non-defending party here may ask the district court
to review the board's final decision - without there being a final decision to review.

As a

necessary result, Idaho Code§ 43-719(4) does not provide a true remedy to Salladay in the case
at bar. The chronological processes described in Idaho Code§ 43-719 end upon the issuance of
a tax deed by default, or they begin when a party appears to defend at the time and place
provided in the notice of pending issuance of a tax deed. The latter did not occur and the former
ended the remedial processes provided for in Idaho Code§§ 43-719(2) and 43-719(4). Thus, the
district court did not have statutory authority to remand this case to the CILD Board.
D. Salladay's petition was filed untimely.
Further, even if the analysis regarding Idaho Code § 43-719 can be analyzed in a different
way leading to a different conclusion, Salladay's petition fails for lack of timeliness. Idaho Code
§ 43-719(4) provides that a petition for judicial review of a tax deed's issuance be filed with the

court "within thirty (30) days after receipt of the final decision of the board." CILD issued an
O&M deed to itself on July 14, 2014. See generally R. pp. 55- 57. At that point in time, CILD
had already gone through the process described in Idaho Code § 43-719. Without having a tax
certificate or a deed for the subject property already, CILD could not have granted the deed to
the Bowens on December 19, 2014. Salladay's petition was not filed until January 5, 2015. R.
p. 2 L. 13, p. 5.

More than 30 days elapsed between July 14, 2014 and January 5, 2015.

Therefore, Salladay's petition for judicial review is untimely.
E.

Even if Salladay is a party in interest under Idaho Law, Salladay received actual

knowledge of the pending issuance of the tax deed pursuant to Idaho Code 43-717(6).
Salladay alleges that he did not receive notice of the pending issuance of the tax deed. R.
p. 24 L. 12 - 14, 21, 22. Salladay further alleges that: "There is no dispute about the fact that
the Plaintiff, a party in interest and of record, did not receive any notice of the pending issuance
of the tax deed." R. p. 39 L. 4 - 7. A closer look at Idaho Code§ 43-717(6), however, shows
that there is a dispute because Salladay received sufficient notice of the pending issuance of the
tax deed.
Idaho Code § 43-717(6) states as follows: "If a record owner or owners or a party in
interest shall have actual knowledge of the notice of pending issuance of a tax deed or that
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issuance of a tax deed is pending, it shall be deemed sufficient notice under this section."
(Bolded emphasis added). The word "or" precedes each type of party or parties that are listed.
The statute does not state: "it shall be deemed sufficient notice required in this section as to that
party." See generally Idaho Code§ 43-717(6). Instead, the statute states: "it shall be deemed

sufficient notice under this section." (Bolded emphasis added). Those words are broad and
inclusive as opposed to narrow. Thus, the plain language of the statute provides that actual
knowledge to one party is sufficient to provide actual notice to all.
Idaho Law presumes that a public officer did his duty and complied with the law upon
executing an affidavit of compliance. See Shail v. Croxford, 54 Idaho 408, 415, 32 P.2d 777,
779 (S. Ct. 1934); see also Sims v. Milwaukee Land Co., 20 Idaho 513, 119 P. 37; Harper v. City

of Conway Springs; and Idaho Code § 43-720(7). CILD' s treasurer, who executed an affidavit
pursuant to Idaho Code § 43-718, is a public officer. It is further presumed that: "All statutes
pertaining to revenue are to be construed most strictly in favor of the object of the statute; that is
in favor of the purpose of the statute." Salisbury v. Lane, 7 Idaho 370, 63 P. 383.
The object of Idaho Code § 43-700 et seq. is to ensure that tax revenue is collected for
irrigation districts while providing a fair and reasonable method to collect tax revenue for
properties that have been delinquent for three or more years. It is logical that actual knowledge,
which is a higher degree of notice than constructive notice, may impute notice to other parties in
privity of contract with the party having actual notice. It is especially logical in the case at bar,
where the Memorandum of Sale provided the address of the property that had been sold and not
any other. See R. p. 85. Stroud received notice of the delinquent assessments and the pending
tax-deed sale. R. p. 114 L. 3, 4. If Stroud and Salladay had an unrecorded agreement that
provided for Salladay to pay the tax bills, then Stroud should have contacted Salladay after
receiving the tax bills, notices of the delinquent assessments, and certainly Stroud should have
contacted Salladay after receiving notice of the pending tax-deed sale. To expect a taxing entity,
such as CILD, to somehow locate another person or entity that CILD had no idea was supposed
to pay the tax assessments, if that is what happened, is unreasonable, given that CILD was
provided with only the address of the subject property.
A property owner has an obligation to pay taxes on that property - it is not something
outside of the usually-expected knowledge of a property owner or other entity with an interest in
the property.

It is unreasonable to record a one-page document that does not contain any
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information regarding where to send tax bills and contains only an address for the subject
property, and then expect to receive tax assessment notices regarding that property at another
address. Regardless, Idaho Code§ 43-717(6) imputed knowledge to Salladay via actual notice to
Stroud. Thus, even if Salladay had properly recorded an instrument and did not receive an actual
letter of notice, he had knowledge of the tax-deed sale pursuant to statute.
F. The district court erred when it found that the Bowens obtained a windfall.

The district court found that the Bowens obtained a windfall and that Salladay lost an
asset worth significantly more than $951.00. R. p. 116 L. 4

7. The record, however, contains

no evidence of the subject property's value. See generally R. Without having a value for the
subject property, it is impossible to determine whether or not Salladay lost an asset worth
significantly more than $951.00.

Without having a value for the subject property, it is

impossible to determine whether or not the Bowens have obtained a windfall. As a result, this
Court should vacate those findings by the district court because the record contains no evidence
to support said findings.
G. The Bowens are entitled to be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs.

Idaho Code § 43-719(5) provides as follows: "All costs and fees of any hearing or
proceeding shall be awarded to the prevailing party; provided however, the costs and fees shall
not be ordered paid by and district or its officials in absence of a showing of gross negligence,
gross nonfeasance, or gross malfeasance by the district or its officers and a showing of
substantial and definite injury to the petitioning party." This action was brought by Salladay,
who failed to properly record a document that provided constructive notice to anyone of its
contents. Any interest that Salladay had in the property is void against the Bowens pursuant to
Idaho Code § 55-812. Even if Salladay had properly recorded the Memorandum of Sale, that
document failed to provide CILD with any address, except for the address of the subject
property, to which tax assessments and notices of delinquency should have been sent Salladay's
failure to properly record a valid instrument or other document providing constructive notice to
anyone that he had an interest in the property may have led to the tax sale. After failing to
comply with Idaho law when he recorded the Memorandum of Sale, and after Stroud failed to
contact Salladay regarding the tax assessments, delinquencies, and the pending tax-deed sale,
Salladay brought this lawsuit against the Bowens, who had every right to presume that CILD
complied with the law in the proceedings leading up to the issuance of the tax deed. The
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Bowens have now incurred substantial legal fees and costs in defending against Salladay' s
lawsuit, including bringing this appeal. Not only does Idaho Code§ 43-719(5) provide that the
Bowens "shall be awarded" "all costs and fees" incurred in this action, but justice requires it as
well. The Bowens respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court and award them their
attorneys' fees and costs both in this appeal and in the underlying action.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Memorandum of Sale was not properly acknowledged; and therefore, it was not
properly recorded. Because the Memorandum of Sale was not properly recorded, it imparted
constructive notice to no one and CILD was not required to provide notice of the pending tax.deed sale to Salladay. Further, because Salladay failed to record a legally valid instrument, his
Memorandum of Sale is void against the Bowens pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-812. Salladay's
petition to the district court was untimely. In addition, the plain language of Idaho Code § 43-

717(6) imputes Stroud's actual knowledge to Salladay. Based upon the foregoing law, authority,
and analysis, the Bowens respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court and find that
Salladay's petition must be dismissed based upon one or more of the reasons argued in this brief.
The Bowens further ask this Court to award them their attorneys fees' and costs both in the
underlying action and in this appeal.

Respectfully submitted this(\~~ of March 2016.
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